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Plaintiff-Appellant Garth Youd submits this Answer to
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals, and the invitation of the Clerk of the Utah
Court of Appeals dated January 29, 1990.
BACKGROUND
Garth Youd brought this action to recover for respondents'

negligent prosecution of an action on behalf

against Zions First National Bank ("Zions").

of Youd

The action against

Zions was based on Zions' improper reissuance of two certificates
of

deposit

to appellant's

father, Wilford

Youd, and

to his

daughters.
Respondents admitted their negligence in the representation of appellant, but disputed the issue of damages.

As a

result, the action focused on whether appellant would have been
successful in its underlying action against Zions.

Both parties

moved for summary judgment, and the trial court ruled that Utah
Code Ann. S 75-6-112 protects Zions from liability in the transaction as a matter of law.
Garth Youd appealed the summary judgment ruling, claiming that a material issue of fact exists as to whether Zions had
reissued the $10,000 certificate of deposit to Garth Youd before
Wilford Youd's contrary instructions.
the

legal

conclusions

of

the trial

Appellant also disputed
court, arguing

that his

possession and due presentment of the $10,000 certificate of
deposit

entitled

him

to payment pursuant

to Utah

Code Ann.

§ 7QA-3-116, that Wilford Youd was wrongfully reissued the certificates of deposit because he failed to make a "proper request"
as required by SS 75-6-108 and 75-6-101, and that Zions was liable for conversion of the $10,000 and $15,000 certificates.
Respondents countered by arguing that the UCC did not
apply

because

no

"presentment" occurred, that Wilford Youd's

request was proper, that no issue of material fact existed as to
the reissuance of the $10,000 certificate of deposit, that there
was no claim for conversion because no bailment occurred, and
that, even if a bailee/bailor relationship was created, Zions
acted properly in following Wilford Youd's directions.
In its recently-issued opinion, this Court ruled that
the UCC does not apply because the certificates were not "negotiable instruments" as defined by the UCC.

The Court also con-

cluded that the certificates of deposit were ambiguous as to
whether they were joint accounts in both Garth and Wilford Youd.
It was determined that Wilford Youd's
accounts must therefore be examined.

intent in creating the
If Wilford Youd did not

intend to create joint accounts, then Garth Youd's claims are
groundless and it is irrelevant whether S 75-6-112 applies.

If,

on the other hand, the fact finder concludes that Wilford did

-2-

intend

a

joint

account,

the

legal

issues

surrounding

the

reissuance of the certificates and the application of S 75-6-112
must be considered.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING REHEARING
Respondents

now seek

a rehearing, arguing

that the

application of Section 75-6-112 to protect Zions from liability
does not depend on whether the accounts were joint or singleparty accounts.
Appellant finds himself in the difficult position of
agreeing with the court's decision to reverse and remand, but
disagreeing with the basis for that decision.

Due to our concern

that remand to the lower court on the issue suggested in the
Court's opinion would not result in a satisfactory lower court
resolution, appellant joins respondents in seeking a rehearing.
Be it noted, however, that the following reasons in support of
rehearing differ greatly from those set forth by respondents:
1.

Neither party on appeal disputed the factual issue

of whether the certificates of deposit were ambiguous as to the
nature of their ownership.

Appellant has consistently claimed

that the certificates are clearly joint accounts because they are
payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd."

Respondents also relied

on the factual premise of joint ownership in their argument for
the application of § 75-6-112, which only applies to multiple-3-

party accounts.

Nonetheless, the Court determined that nothing

on the face of the certificates reveals joint ownership and that
they

are

therefore

ambiguous.

Consequently,

the

Court

has

remanded the action for a determination of Wilford Youd's intent
when he created the accounts.

Though we commend the Court's

reversal of the lower court's erroneous summary judgment ruling,
we respectfully urge the Court to reconsider the basis for the
reversal consistent with the disputed facts raised on appeal,
i .e. , whether the $10,000 certificate of deposit was reissued as
a single-party account in Garth Youd's name.

Even if the Court

determines that there is no dispute as to the reissuance of the
$10,000 certificate, we would ask that the Court evaluate the
flaws in the lower court's legal conclusions which were raised on
appeal.
2.

The Court's conclusion that Wilford Youd's intent

is critical in determining the applicability of S 75-6-112 undermines the expressly-worded purpose of SS 75-6-108 and 75-6-112,
which

is to discharge

inquire

as

accounts.

to

the

financial

beneficial

institutions
ownership

of

from having

to

multiple-party

A remand to the lower court for the purpose of analyz-

ing intent will undoubtedly result in a second appeal.
3.
conclusion

Plaintiff seeks review of the lower court's legal
that

S

75-6-112

applies

-4-

to

protect

Zions

from

liability under the facts of this case.

Plaintiff reasserts the

arguments briefed and argued in this appeal against the present
application of § 75-6-112.

Appellant argues in his Brief that

the $10,000 certificate was duly reissued in Garth Youdfs name
alone

at his

request, thus creating

Brief of Appellant, p. 20.

a single-party account.

Zions' subsequent reissuance of both

certificates at the request and in the name of Wilford Youd was
therefore

not

a

payment

on

a

multiple-party

account,

and

S 75-6-112 does not control.
4.

Again, relying on the undisputed fact that the

certificates of deposit were joint accounts of which Garth Youd
was a payee, appellant's entrustment of the certificates to Zions
gave rise to a bailee/bailor relationship which obligated Zions
to exercise due care in complying with appellant's instructions.
Zions breached that duty and clearly repudiated appellant's ownership rights by extinguishing appellant's ownership interest in
both certificates and replacing them with certificates
names of Wilford Youd and his daughters.

in the

Such actions support

appellant's claims of negligence and conversion against Zions.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE BASIS FOR THE COURT'S REMAND IS LEGALLY
AMISS AND BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE COURT'S
REVIEW.
Plaintiff feels it necessary to respectfully question

the grounds upon which the Court reversed and remanded the lower
court's summary judgment ruling.

We hesitate to dispute a result

sought on appeal, but the instructions accompanying the Court's
reversal and remand will undoubtedly cause need for a second
appeal and further expense if not presently reevaluated.

Plain-

tiff seeks a rehearing while stressing his position that other
very tenable grounds for reversal exist as set forth below and in
the Brief of Appellant.
Plaintiff

questions

the Court's

remand on scope of

review grounds and legal grounds.
A.

The Factual Issue Upon Which the Court
Reversed and Remanded the Case Was Not
Disputed by the Parties to the Appeal.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for
summary judgment if "no genuine issue as to any material fact"
exists.

The presence of a dispute between the parties as to a

material fact disallows the granting of summary judgment.
Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1978).

Bill

It fol-

lows that when a fact is not disputed by the parties, it cannot
serve to defeat summary judgment.

-6-

The court concluded that the certificates of deposit
were ambiguous as to ownership, thus requiring a factual inquiry
into Wilford Youd's intent when he created the accounts.

How-

ever, both parties have conceded that the certificates were joint
accounts.

Throughout this action, defendants have relied almost

exclusively on Utah Code Ann. $ 75-6-112, which applies to protect financial institutions from liability for payment to a party
of a multiple-party account.

Respondents' Brief on this very

appeal sets forth a separate argument stressing the fact that the
certificates are joint accounts under Utah law.

Brief of Respon-

dents, p. 10.
Appellant has also consistently argued that the certificates are clearly joint accounts, as evidenced by the fact that
they are payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd."
The parties' summary judgment motions were an attempt
to get beyond potential factual disputes and focus on the legal
issues in this case.

It became apparent from those motions that

the parties could not agree on the factual issue of reissuance,
but no dispute arose as to the joint ownership of the accounts.
The Court's remand on the "intent" issue will require unnecessary
litigation concerning undisputed facts and delay consideration of
the truly disputed factual and legal issues in this case.

-7-

See

Reliable Furn. Co, v. Fidelity & Guar, Ins., 398 P.2d 685 (Utah
1965).
B.

An Analysis of "Intent" In Determining
the Applicability of Section 75-6-112
Undermines the Express Purpose of the
Statute to Avoid Such an Inquiry.

The Court's instructions on remand to determine Wilford
Youd's intent in establishing the accounts creates a disturbing
circular argument and undermines the purpose of the statute which
seeks interpretation in this action.
Utah Code Ann. S 75-6-108 states that:
Financial
institutions
may
enter
into
multiple-party accounts to the same extent
that
they may enter
into single-party
accounts. Any multiple-party account may be
paidr on request, to any one or more of the
parties. A financial institution shall not
be required to inquire as to the source of
funds received for deposit to a multipleparty account, or to inquire as to the proposed application of any sum withdrawn from
an account, for purposes of establishing net
contributions.
(Emphasis added).

Section 75-6-112 provides in relevant part:

Payment made pursuant to Section 75-6-108
. discharges the financial institution
from all claims for amounts so paid whether
or not the payment is consistent with the
beneficial ownership of the account as
between [the] parties. . . .
(Emphasis added).
The express purpose of these provisions is to allow
financial

institutions

to pay

out

-8-
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of the Court's published opinion, the duty to inquire into the
intent of the parties has been revitalized whenever the account
does not expressly state that it is owned jointly.

It is no

longer enough to meet the requirements of a joint account set
forth in $ 75-6-101(4).
opinion

undermines

We respectfully submit that the Court's

the purpose

of

section

75-6-112

and, as

claimed by defendants, removes the statutory shield of liability
provided to banks by the provision.
II.

THE COURT'S OPINION DID NOT CONSIDER THE ONLY
DISPUTED ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT RAISED BY
APPELLANT, I.E., WHETHER THE $10,000 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT WAS REISSUED TO GARTH YOUD AS
A SINGLE-PARTY ACCOUNT.
The Court's opinion did not discuss the disputed fac-

tual issue raised by appellant on appeal.
there was no resolution

Appellant argues that

in the lower court of the

issue of

whether Zions followed Garth Youd's request and reissued the
$10,000 certificate in his name alone.

This fact is critical in

determining the applicability of S 75-6-112 to protect Zions from
liability.

If the certificate was reissued in Garth's name alone

as requested, then S 75-6-112 would not apply to protect the bank
for payment from the reissued single-party account.

Zions would

thus be liable for its subsequent reissuance of the certificate
to Wilford Youd, who would no longer be a party to the account.
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"Request" means a proper request for withdrawal, or a check or order for payment,
which complies with all conditions of the
account,
including
special
requirements
concerning necessary signatures and regulations of financial institutions . . .
(Emphasis added.)
In light of the above provisions, Section 75-6-112 does
not provide protection to a financial institution which complies
with the request for withdrawal of funds that is not made according to the terms of the account.

The terms of the two certifi-

cates of deposit at issue are listed on the face of each certificate.

According to these terms, for payment to be made, the

certificates must be 1) presented to Zions; 2) surrendered to
Zions; and 3) properly endorsed.

It is undisputed that Wilford

Youd's "request" consisted of a telephone conversation with a
Zion's employee wherein he orally requested that Garth Youd's
name be removed from the certificates and be replaced by his
names and the names of his two daughters.
present

or

surrender

endorse

either

of

the

the certificates
certificates.

Wilford Youd did not

to Zions, nor did he
Zions

followed Wilford

Youd's instructions despite their clear noncompliance with the
payment

terms

of

the

certificates.

Because

Wilford

Youd's

request was not a "proper request" as required by S 75-6-101,
Zions is not entitled to the protection of § 75-6-112.
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questions can be considered by this Court without remand to the
trial court, and respondent respectfully seeks this review.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant joins with respondents in requesting that the court rehear the issues in this
case.
DATED this

/"*- day of February, 1990.

A
. HASLAM
HOWARD C. YOUNG
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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